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Introduction
In December 1979, the Soviet army invaded Afghanistan. 
Since then, the country has been caught in a spiral of violence 
from which it has not yet emerged. Between 1992 and 1994, 
20,000 people died (Johnson, 2004) and almost  half of the 
southern area of the city was destroyed.
In 1996, the Taliban brought peace to the capital and 
ended-up dominating most of the country, imposing the 
strictest form of Islam. Their policy towards women and 
their position vis-à-vis Islamic terrorism alienated the country 
from the international community. This situation only ceased 
with their fall, following the September the 11th attacks. It 
opened the country to foreign troups but little stability was 
established
Kabul severely suffered from the conflict. Not only did it 
experience violence and destruction directed at its population 
and infrastructure but it received a large number  of displaced 
persons fleeing war raging in the countryside until 1992. Ten 
years later, the return of refugees, mostly from neighbour-
ing Iran and Pakistan, provoked a sudden increase of the 
population. This justified that a large share of the assistance, 
including water and sanitation projects, was directed to the 
capital. The strategy adopted to deliver this assistance varied 
according to the political context. It is reviewed in this paper, 
paying special attention to its impact and cost-effectiveness 
in terms of  benefits to the most in need.
Water and sanitation systems in Kabul
Kabul relies exclusively on groundwater for its water supply. 
There are four types of water systems:
• Private well
• Public wells
• The water network
• Water trucking
The number of private wells is commonly estimated to be 
in the range of 100,000 to 120,000 (Nembrini et al, 2002). 
Most of them are unprotected hand-dug wells while some 
wealthy households may have boreholes equipped with 
hand-pumps or submersible pumps. The majority of the 
private hand-dug wells are not used for drinking or cooking 
and are particularly vulnerable to drought.
Before war reached Kabul, most of the public wells were 
hand-dug and usually unprotected. From 1994, given the 
almost complete interruption of piped-water supply, several 
organisations started drilling boreholes in public places 
throughout the city and equipping them with hand-pumps (see 
photograph 1). From 1994, the main organisations involved 
were the French NGO ‘Solidarités’ and UNCHS-Habitat. 
They were followed by the International Committee of the 
Red Cross (ICRC) and by the other French NGO ‘Action 
contre la Faim’ (ACF). In 2002, the number of hand-pumps 
was estimated at more than 2,600 (Nembrini et al, 2002). 
People usually trust water from hand-pumps for drinking 
and cooking.
Kabul water and environmental sanitation services have been affected by war, which ravaged large portions of the city in 
the early 1990’s. After the fall of the Taliban in 2002, a considerable influx of returnees contributed to put an ever greater 
stress on already deficient systems. Large-scale water supply projects were initiated. However, they tackle only areas covered 
by water networks, leaving behind an estimated 60% of the population who live in ‘unplanned areas’. In order to address 
the needs of these ‘left-behind’ populations, organisations such as ‘Action Contre la Faim’ have designed programmes 
specifically for them. They intend to maximize the benefit of water and environmental sanitation by relying on affordable 
community-maintained systems,  until access  to centralized services is gained.
Photograph 1. Handpump installed by ACF in Dashti-
Barchi area
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Kabul water network consists of 11 interconnected and 14 
independent schemes. In addition, six apartment-blocks have 
their own water supply. The network is fed by 81 wells and 
supplies 43,000 houses (about 20% of the households) and 
1,600 public tap-stands (Nembrini et al, 2002).
Water trucking is mostly carried out by the NGO Care 
in areas where other water sources are not easily available. 
There are also private sellers, who usually charge one US 
dollar for 200 litres.
The following sanitation systems are in use in Kabul:
1. Dry vault latrines
2. Septic tanks 
3. Pour-flush toilets
4. A sewerage network
Dry vault latrines are, by far, the most common system. 
The vault opens onto the street, from where it is emptied 
by farmers who traditionally convert the night soil into 
fertilizer. 
Septic tanks are either collective in apartment-blocks, 
public buildings and in a few public toilets or individual in 
the case of some wealthy households. 
Pour-flush toilets are the most recent systems in use. They 
are connected to a pit that can be emptied from the street. 
The sewerage network serves the city’s main apartment 
blocks complex. Wastewater is supposed to be treated in a 
conventional treatment plant. It was no longer operational in 
1999 (Jansen et al, 2000) and still does not function today. 
Gully suckers are available from Kabul Municipality or 
from private companies and empty both septic tanks and 
pour-flush toilets. Sewage is then disposed on drying beds. 
Once dry, it is reused as fertilizer.
Assistance strategy
Water supply
The purpose of the large number of boreholes constructed 
between 1994 and 1996 was to provide water to the areas 
of Kabul most affected by the interruption of piped water. 
This was due to the looting of pumping stations during the 
fighting and to the disruption of power supply. Concurrently, 
‘Solidarités’ and Care helped restoring some of the water 
network capacity by performing essential repairs including 
the replacement of  generators in the pumping stations and 
the provision of fuel to run them (see figure 1).
‘Solidarités’ assistance was abruptly interrupted in 1998 
when the European Commission Humanitarian Office 
(ECHO) suspended funding for Kabul following the con-
troversial decision from the Taliban authorities to impose 
that all the NGOs relocate in a single building. Care could 
however continue its assistance. The situation deteriorated 
further, after the United Nations embargo on Afghanistan 
(end of 1999), which limited UN assistance to ‘life-saving’ 
activities.
The fall of the Taliban paved the way to a massive but 
relatively slow reconstruction process. Major donors returned 
and, in the field of water supply, the German development 
bank KfW and the World Bank were the main players. An 
‘Immediate Assistance’ project funded by KfW was carried 
out between 2002 and 2005 with the aim of  performing 
the most essential repairs allowing the water network to 
function. From 2005 a project was launched with the aim 
of expanding the network capacity to 111,000 connections 
(see figure 1). (Fischaess, 2003).
The water supply network is managed by the  public 
utility ‘Central Authority for Water Supply and Sewerage’ 
(CAWSS). It has considerably suffered from the conflict. 
According to Salim Karimi, who was president of CAWSS 
in 1992, CAWSS used to employ 34 qualified engineers 
before the war reached Kabul. This number is today reduced 
to three, including the current president.  Most of the equip-
ment, tools and vehicles were stolen and the archives lost. 
The situation remained virtually unchanged until 2002 when 
a number of organisation such as KfW project, Care, the 
World Bank and others restocked the equipment, trained the 
personnel and provided vehicles. Given its almost inexistent 
managerial staff, CAWSS can only carry out routine opera-
tion and maintenance and has a limited operational role in 
the rehabilitation and expansion of the network. The lack 
of personnel is one of the main problems the institution has 
to face and, despite external support, no credible policy to 
tackle the problem has so far been implemented.
Environmental sanitation
One of Kabul’s main environmental sanitation issues is 
excreta management. In 1996, concerns over the possi-
ble health consequences of night soil being exposed and 
sometimes flowing in the streets from vault latrines led the 
ICRC to initiate a large scale sanitation project. It consisted 
of rehabilitating  or reconstructing private vault latrines, 
increasing the size of the chamber, separating urine, in-
stalling a ventilation pipe and, most importantly, installing 
doors on the emptying hole (made of cement or metal) in 
order to confine night soil. Night soil collectors continued 
the evacuation of excreta with shovels and carts and its 
reuse as fertilizer after composting. The ICRC targeted the 
most densely populated areas of Kabul northern districts. 
Other organisations implemented similar projects and, by 
the end of 1999, 48,300 latrines had been rehabilitated or 
Figure 1. Water production in Kabul in m3/day
Source: Salim Karimi (Beller-Kocks) and CAWSS
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reconstructed (Jansen et al, 2000). ACF initiated its water 
and sanitation project in 2001. It targeted areas with high 
prevalence of malnutrition identified through ACF network 
of  Supplementary Feeding Centres and Mother and Child 
Clinics. The rationale behind this strategy was that diarrhoea 
is one of the main cause of malnutrition during  the summer 
months. ACF built almost 3000 latrines between 2001 and 
2005 (Pinera, 2005) and remain the only organisation cur-
rently considering this type of activity as the ICRC gave up 
sanitation work in 2003 (see photograph 2).
Addressing the needs: Kabul vulnerable 
areas
The recent influx of returnees to Kabul, which may have 
increased the population by one million inhabitants has made 
difficult the establishment of population statistics. Official 
figures nonetheless exist (but no reliable census has been 
carried out since 1999!) and table 1 shows the (estimated) 
evolution  since 1996.
The approximate figure of 2.7 millions is widely assumed 
as close to reality. Its distribution has evolved since 1979 as 
several movements of population took place:
• Influx from the provinces ravaged by war between 1979 
and 1992.
• Movement within the city between 1992 and 1994 as 
people escaped fighting in the southern areas of the city 
and sought refuge in the north.
• Influx from abroad and from a number of provinces in 
2002, after the fall of the Taliban. 
These movements of population, and more particularly 
the last one, contributed to augment the population density 
in existing residential areas.  A large number of families 
also settled outside the planned areas. Informal settlements 
initially populated the hilly areas of Kabul but progressively 
expanded outside the city limits 
This expansion created areas of vulnerability, characterised 
by a high population density and few or none of the most 
basic urban services (water, power supply, drainage, road 
maintenance). A recent study carried out by ACF revealed 
that as much as 60% of Kabul population may live in these 
unplanned areas. In the densely populated Central Bazaar, 
51% of the families live in a single room of 15.5 m2 on 
average. Over 26% of the population spends more than 30 
minutes to fetch water and 33.58% of the main income earn-
ers rely on daily work (Grinell and Troc, 2004)
Unbalanced approaches
Whilst urban poverty seems to be a growing problem in 
Kabul, new assistance projects for the city are increasingly 
difficult to finance. It appears that ‘emergency’ donors such 
as ECHO tend to limit the amount of  funds available for 
Kabul. It is the result of a policy aiming to redirect assist-
ance towards rural areas, where considerable needs exist, 
in order to avoid discontent. In addition, the launch of large 
infrastructure projects, and in particular water network 
rehabilitation/expansion funded by KfW and the World 
Bank, may give the impression that needs in the cities are 
addressed in their entirety.
It is a paradox that a policy whose objective is to balance 
the assistance between urban and rural areas may lead to 
greater unbalance within the city of Kabul. Most of the cur-
rent water supply rehabilitation/expansion concentrate on 
the ‘planned areas’. Therefore only a minority of relatively 
well-off families with access to the water networks benefit 
from them. Those living in the unplanned areas may end-up 
feeling abandoned, and discontent may also rise in certain 
areas of the capital.
ACF is one of the rare organisations which carried out 
water and sanitation assistance to the unplanned areas (see 
table 2). The organisation is struggling to continue its activi-
ties whilst access to water in these areas remains precari-
ous. Excreta disposal and evacuation is an ever increasing 
problem as farmers, who used to empty the latrines, tend to 
sell their lands whose value increase with the expansion of 
the city. Municipal authorities do nothing to help and tend, 
Photograph 2. Improved latrine built by ACF  
in Aqa Ali Shams area
Table 1. Population estimations  
Year Population Source
1986 1,300,000 Central Statistical Office 
1988 1,424,400 The World Gazeteer1
1994 800,000 The Independent2
1996 1,101,889 UNCHS Habitat 
1999 1,781,012 UNRCO Kabul3
2003 2,678,000 Central Statistical Office 
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on the contrary, to discourage organisations from working 
in unplanned areas.
ACF relies on hand-pumps and private latrines for its 
programme because these systems present the advantage 
of being affordable to the urban poor. Currently, they are 
the only types of systems potentially sustainable in Kabul. 
Hand-pumps are easy to repair by local mechanics. Their 
models are standardized and spare parts are widely available. 
The main constrain linked to the use of vault latrine is the 
necessary regular emptying. This can be organised provided 
that night soil collectors are identified and paid. 
Making arrangements to guarantee the sustainable use of 
hand-pumps and latrines is the role of water committees ACF 
has put in place. They ensure that regular maintenance of 
the hand-pumps is carried out and deal with farmer for the 
collection and evacuation of night-soil. In addition, hygiene 
promotion activities, benefiting individual families as well 
as target groups (female, male and children), contribute to 
raised awareness on environmental health issues.
The cost of ACF’s and of other similar programmes target-
ing unplanned areas is a tiny fraction of the budget allocated 
to the planned ones. Ironically, and despite the efforts put into 
rehabilitating the network, piped water supply is sporadic, 
water being available no more  than a few hours a day or a 
week. Hand-pumps and, in places, water sellers remain a 
necessary back-up. One of the reason to the lack of progress 
in the quality of the service is the low capacity of CAWSS, 
which seems a persistent problem despite the efforts of 
various organisations. It appears therefore unlikely that a 
service already poor in its current state will be extended to 
‘unplanned areas’ in the foreseeable future.
Conclusion
Water and sanitation assistance to Kabul  requires an ap-
proach which is different from what is commonly applied 
to urban areas of the developing world. After more than 
twenty five years of conflict and instability, institutions are 
so weak that strengthening them may take years. As a con-
sequence, the economy of scale that piped water networks 
represent is compromised by deficiencies in maintenance and 
considerable difficulties in recovering costs.  Pipe sewerage 
and treatment is an even greater problem and no credible 
alternative seems to be feasible other than dry sanitation. 
While conventional urban approaches are failing, the needs 
of those ‘left behind’ are ignored by many, and in particular 
by municipal authorities and the water utility.
It is therefore urgent to allocate more resources to these 
unplanned areas, where the vast majority of the urban poor 
are living. Particular attention should be paid to the ‘hilly 
areas’ where access to both water and sanitation are often 
critically difficult. Affordable systems such as hand-pumps 
and latrines appear to be the answer in most places to maxi-
mize the benefits from water and environmental sanitation as 
they allow community-based management. By increasing the 
number of projects targeting these areas, living conditions 
would be eased for a large population until more conventional 
urban systems can finally reach them.
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Table 2. : ACF activities in ‘unplanned areas’  
Activity Achievements 
Drainage Stone-masonry side-ditches 
(15.7 km) 
Private well rehabilitation 507
Public boreholes and 
hand-pumps 
531
Water scheme 1 (90m3 reservoir, 41 tapstands) 
Private latrines 2954
Solid waste containers 45
